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Whither Public Interest: 





During the last three decades there has been an almost continuous undermining of the public 
interest by private interests operating either outside or inside Greek public administration. The 
result of this infiltration has been a gradual loss of bureaucratic autonomy to pursue the public 
interest. The web of relationships developed between private interests and the two dominant 
political parties have eroded both the efficacy of public administration and the dynamism of 
the private sector as incumbent firms and public (or quasi-public) sector functionaries have 
been using their power to prevent the birth of new firms and to raid the state coffers. The 
upshot of these have been the emergence of permanently large budget and current account 
deficits, which have in turn driven Greece’s foreign indebtedness to alarming levels, 
necessitating the current bailout by the EU/ECB/IMF. 
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How did you go bankrupt?” Bill asked.  
“Two ways,” Mike said. “Gradually and then suddenly.” 
—Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises 
 
1.  Introduction 
At the turn of the millennium, the prospects for the Greek economy were anything but 
dismal. The country had just experienced a few years of high growth and fiscal 
consolidation (after a dismal economic and fiscal performance from 1980 to 1995), and 
the European Council in June 2000 had just decided that Greece would be accepted into 
the Economic and Monetary Union. Following this decision, Prime Minister Costas 
Simitis confidently predicted that “… this development permits us now to better exploit 
possibilities provided by European unification and constitutes a qualitative change since 
it promotes Greece to a higher level,", adding also that  “…accession to the euro means 
greater economic stability, better growth rates and more confidence”.  Indeed, the 
average annual growth rate from 2000 to 2008 was almost 4% per annum.
1  
However, with the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, Greece’s economic 
situation has been deteriorating at an alarming rate. Although Greece has, so far, avoided 
the sharp drops in output experienced by many economies as a result of the global 
economic crisis, the slowdown in output growth has been large. Moreover, other 
indicators of economic performance point to a protracted period of slow and painful 
recovery. The existence of huge budget and current account deficits, combined with high 
levels of government and external debt make it very likely that the following decade will 
surpass the 1980s as the decade with the worst economic performance since 1950. The 
decision made by the Greek government on April 23, 2010 to seek financial support from 
the EU/ECB/IMF in order to be able to roll over its maturing debt obligations testifies to 
the graveness of the situation.      
The problems facing Greece stem from one basic factor, namely the absence of an 
autonomous and efficient state bureaucracy whose role is to promote and defend the 
public interest; instead, since Greece’s modern reincarnation in the 19
th century as a 
                                                 
1 The mood expressed by the Prime Minister was also shared by the majority of the population and the 
academic community. Pagoulatos (2003) captured this ebullient feeling with these words: “A most 
impressive transformation involves Greece’s position in the EU. Greece is no more the “reluctant partner”, 
the “problem case”, the “black sheep” of the Community (to recall just some of the rather uncharitable 
terms once employed). It has matured to become not just a “normal” country, a “mainstream” EU member, 
but an ardent and committed European, and (since its 2001 EMU entry) finally a “success story” as well. 
This graduation from troubled adolescence and marginality to European “normality” and membership to 
the Eurozone core of Europe not only summarizes the momentous socioeconomic and political 
transformation of Greece, but it also testifies to the success of the European Union in helping bring about 
this transformation.” 
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nation state, the state bureaucracy has been captured by party-political and private 
interests, whereas it has used its limited autonomy to the benefit of its functionaries (see, 
Mouzelis, 1978, Mavrogordatos, 2001).  The upshot of this has been that during periods 
in which borrowing was perceived to be easy and cheap (e.g., after Greece’s entry into 
EMU), there was no mechanism to stop debt from accumulating; it was during such 
periods that the culture of soft budget constraints was legitimized as “rational” response 
to the new opportunities offered by the low-interest rates and high-growth environment.   
 
In the rest of the paper we shall first present (Section 2) an overview of the evolution of 
the Greek economy. As we shall see, the end of fast growth in Greece (relative to the 
other OECD countries) came to a halt at the start of the 1980s. The start of this decade 
coincided with two events, i.e. Greece’s accession to the EEC and the rise of the socialist 
party (PASOK) to power; as is to be expected in such cases, the relative importance of 
each factor for the precipitous decline in the growth rate remains a hotly disputed issue 
(the EEC for forcing an end to the pampered situation under which many Greek 
industries operated, PASOK for pursuing irresponsible wage and spending policies). The 
laxity of economic policy during that decade set the bedrock on which subsequent 
governments (with a brief interlude in the second half of the 1990s) built the tombstone 
of fiscal irresponsibility which culminated in the present crisis.  
 
The (mostly) lukewarm attempts by the Greek fiscal authorities to put the brakes on 
further debt accumulation during the last two decades is examined in Section 3. Using the 
government budget constraint, we separate the influence of four factors to public debt 
accumulation. These are: (i) the structural component, which measures the contribution 
of the primary deficit to debt accumulation if the economy is operating at full capacity, 
(ii) the cyclical  component, which measures the contribution that the primary deficit 
makes to debt accumulation as a result of the economy operating below capacity, (iii) the 
rate  component, which measures  the influence of the difference between the (real) 
interest rate and growth of GDP on the debt ratio, and (iv) the stock-flow adjustment, 
which, especially in the Greek context, arises from the fact that governments undertake 
various activities which are not reported in the budget but contribute to debt 
accumulation. We find that the fiscal authorities have not been able to generate the 
primary structural surpluses which would have been necessary to offset the effect that the 
huge stock-flow adjustments had on debt accumulation. 
 
In Section 4 we examine in more detail the separate influence of government spending 
and government revenue on government deficits. We find that the rise in deficits was not 
due to a decline in tax revenue, but to a large increase in government spending which 
occurred in the 1980s. The rise in spending was mainly driven by increases in public 
sector pay and employment, reflecting the fact that public sector employment has 
remained a main tool through which political parties in Greece dispense favours to 
partisan voters, as well a “redistributive” tool in periods of high unemployment. The rise 
in government revenue followed, sometimes with considerable lag, the rise in 
government spending. Unlike government spending, whose fastest rise took place in the 
1980s (its share in GDP rose by 18 percentage points), government revenue as a share of 
GDP rose by only 5 percentage points in the 1980s. In an effort to gain EMU entry, the   4
distance between spending and revenue was closed significantly in the 1990s through 
large increases in tax revenue, but EMU entry and the global financial crisis increased the 
gap once again during the last decade.  
 
The politico-economic factors behind the structure, conduct and performance of the 
Greek economy in recent decades are explained in Section 5. We contend that a crucial 
factor in this respect, and which has been steadily eroding the foundations of Greek 
society and will impact on the resolution of the current fiscal crisis, is the 
interdependence between the tax burden, public good provision, tax compliance, and 
sectoral allocation of economic activity. The rise of budget deficits during the last three 
decades reflect, in addition to outright corruption, the increasing inability of the public 
sector to deliver on the public goods and services which higher-taxed citizens (i.e., the 
law-abiding ones who do not evade on their taxes and thus face tax burdens significantly 
higher than the economy-wide average) have every right to expect in return. This has 
created a further “legitimization” of tax evasion as more citizens consider that there has 
been a “breach of contract” with the state. The greater willingness to evade taxes has in 
turn privileged the non-traded sector at the expense of the traded sector since tax evasion 
is more easily carried out in the non-traded sector (medical and law services, car repairs, 
etc). The upshot is a vicious circle in which the efforts of government to collect more 
taxes by raising tax rates shifts resources to the sector more prone to tax evasion, thus, in 
the medium-term, worsening both the fiscal and the current account deficits.  
 
The paper concludes with Section 6 in which we draw some inferences from our analysis 
of the past in order to identify issues which must be effectively dealt with if Greece is to 
avoid getting caught in a downward spiral which would make all the more difficult to 
“graduate” from the present crisis.   
 
 
2.  A Bird’s Eye View of the Evolution of Macroeconomic Aggregates 
 
In this section we give a brief overview of the main macroeconomic developments in 
Greece during the last four decades.  
 
Following the end of the civil war in 1949, which started immediately after the official 
end of the Second World War, Greece started its reconstruction period in the 1950s. 
According to Maddison (1995), Greece had the lowest per-capita income among the EU-
15 countries in 1950. As is to be expected in such cases, the country experienced fast 
growth rates for three decades. Indeed, from 1950 to 1973, Greece was the fastest 
growing economy among the EU-15, and by 1973 its per capita GDP had risen above 
Ireland’s and Portugal’s. During the rest of the 1970s Greece’s growth rate decelerated, 
but it was still the highest among the EU-15, and the second highest (to Japan) growth 
rate among the OECD countries. The evolution of per-capita GDP from 1960 to 2009 (at 
constant prices, with 2000 as the base year), is portrayed in Figure 1, whereas Figure 2 
portrays GDP per capita in Greece relative to the EU15 and the average of Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain (the peripheral 4).   
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Figure 2 here 
 
 
The long period of fast growth came to an abrupt end in the 1980s. During this decade, 
per capita GDP in Greece grew at only 0.3% per annum, compared with 2% for the EU-
15, and 2.1% for the OECD. The start of this decade coincided with two events, i.e. 
Greece’s accession to the EEC and the rise of the socialist party (PASOK) to power.  
Although there is some consensus among Greek economists that both of these events 
contributed to the precipitous decline in the growth rate, the relative importance of each 
factor remains a hotly disputed issue (the EEC for forcing an end to the pampered 
situation under which many Greek industries operated, PASOK for undertaking 
irresponsible wage and spending policies). 
 
The anemic performance of the economy continued until 1993 (the 1990-1993 growth in 
per capita GDP was -0.5% per annum), but improved for the rest the 1990s (Greece, EU-
15, and OECD having the same growth rate for 1994-1999 at 2.2% pa.), and accelerated 
in the first decade of the new millennium (Greece: 3.2%, Euro Area: 2.2% , OECD: 2.5%   
for 2000-2009 pa.) However, as it will become clear presently, the relatively fast growth 
of the last decade did not have solid foundations, but was based on an unsustainable 
public and private spending spree.  
 
The accumulation of public debt through successive budget deficits is depicted in Figure 
3, for the period 1974-2009.
2 For the moment we note the large deficits of the 1980s and 
early 1990s which took the debt-to-GDP ratio from 20% in 1975 to 100% in 1994; the 
fiscal consolidation of the 1994-2000 period as the government was focused on the goal 
of EMU participation; and the relaxation of the effort to fight fiscal profligacy after being 
admitted to the Eurozone.      
  
 
Figure 3 here 
 
                                        
If a picture is worth a thousand words, then the following two diagrams showing the 
evolution of (gross and net) national saving as a percentage of GDP from 1960 to 2009 
take us a long way towards understanding the roots of the present fiscal (but, not only 
fiscal) crisis. The fast growth experienced by the Greek economy after 1950 (identified 
with the initial stages of its catch-up phase with the advanced OECD economies), was 
                                                 
2 From 1953 to 1973 Greek governments were very prudent and, in most years, modest annual surpluses 
were recorded. This fiscal stance was partly a result of the fact that the country could not borrow 
internationally prior to 1966, when the settlement of the 1930s default was finally completed.       6
associated with significant increases in both the net and gross saving rate until 1974. For 
the 35 years since 1974 there has been a steady decline in the saving rate, with the net 
saving rate dropping by about 25 percentage points (from 20% to minus 5% )
3. This huge 
drop in the national saving rate has (since 1988) not been associated with a rise in 
government borrowing, but it is wholly attributable to the decline in the private sector’s 
gross saving rate (from 27% in 1988 to 11% in 2008). In fact, as portrayed in Figure 4, it 
appears that the saving behaviour of the private sector vis-à-vis the (dis)saving behaviour 
of the government resembles what one would expect if the Ricardian hypothesis were 
true (i.e. efforts to decrease government borrowing would be offset by decreased saving 
of the private sector).  
                                                   
 
Figure 4 here 
 
                                            




The decline in the national saving rate experienced by Greece parallels the declines 
observed in many other EU-15 countries, but in no other country has the decline been so 
pronounced. Figure 5 shows the net national saving rate for Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain. Greece and Portugal are the only countries in the Eurozone for 
which the net national saving rate turned negative even before the onset of the global 
financial crisis in 2008
4.                                  
 
The upshot of the large decline in national saving for Greece has been a gradual widening 
of the current account deficit and the accumulation of foreign debt (Figure 6).  During its 
period of fast growth from 1950 to 1973 (about 7% per annum), Greece ran small current 
account deficits which were on average about 2% of GDP. These small current account 
deficits were made up of large deficits in the trade balance (about 7% on average) and 
significant surpluses (about 5% on average) on the income and transfers accounts, mainly 
reflecting remittances from Greek seamen and emigrants. Following the first oil crisis 
and up to Greece’s accession to the EEC in 1981, there was a reduction in the growth rate 
(a still respectable 4% per annum), and a marked improvement in the current account 
which turned into surplus - driven mainly by an improvement in the trade balance. From 
1981 onwards, both the income and trade accounts started deteriorating (as emigrants 
started returning to the home country, and the gradual liberalization of trade took effect), 
but there was an improvement in the transfers balance (mainly transfers from the EU) 
which, as long as it lasted, prevented a large deterioration of the current account.  This 
                                                 
3 The difference between gross and net saving is the depreciation of capital (i.e., capital consumption). We 
also note that gross government saving is defined as the difference between gross government income and 
government consumption expenditure. 
4 Among the likely causes of the decline in the saving rate in Greece is the continuous decline of the share 
of agricultural employment (since farmers face greater income uncertainty than wage earners – especially 
government employees), and the gradual extension of unfunded pension benefits to a larger part of the 
population.     7
came about after 2004, when the surplus in the (current) transfers account decreased, and 
the deficit in the income account deteriorated markedly
5. The current account deficits 
incurred after 2004 have added almost 50 percentage points to the country’s negative net 
foreign asset position as a proportion of GDP, which stood, according to Bank of Greece 
figures, at about 90% of GDP by the end of 2009.       
                                                       
 
Figure 6 here 
 
 
3.   Debt and Deficit Decomposition 
 
In this section we decompose the well-known identity describing the accumulation of 
public debt along the lines suggested by Fortin (1996) and Kneebone and Leach (2001). 
Fortin’s objective was to disentangle the relative importance of the following three 
factors to debt accumulation: (i) over-generous programme spending and lax tax policy 
(and administration) leading to a primary deficit even if the economy is operating at 
potential output; (ii) primary deficits arising as a result of output being below potential 
(due to the influence of automatic stabilizers), either because it has been subjected to 
unfavourable external shocks or because stabilization policies have been inadequate; (iii) 
the (real) interest rate exceeding the GDP growth rate, so that the debt ratio would rise 
even if  programme spending and revenues are equal, as new debt would have to be 
issued to make the interest payments on the existing debt. 
 
The government budget constraint implies that the stock of public debt at the end of 
period t , t B ,  results from inherited debt at the end of period t-1 ,  1 t B − , plus the budget 
deficit during period t,  :   t D
          1 tt t B DB − =+  
Since the budget deficit depends on interest payments (which may be considered not a 
choice variable of the fiscal authorities in period t), and thereby on the inherited level of 
debt  1 t B − , interest payments can be separated from other expenditures, and the 
accumulation identity can be rewritten as: 
         1 (1 ) tt t t B rB P D − =+ +                                                                      (1) 
where, the variable PD is the primary deficit. To account for the effects of growth on the 
government’s ability to borrow, after some simple manipulations we can approximate the 
evolution of government debt in terms of ratios to GDP  (denoted by lowercase letters): 
                                                                      (2)  11 () tt t t t bb rg b p d −− −= − + t
t
An implication of equation (2) is that in order for the debt ratio to be stabilized, the 
primary balance should be such that: 
         ( ) tt t pdr g =− − b
                                                
                                                                            (3) 
 
5 There was a also a deterioration in the merchandise (goods) trade balance, which was offset by the 
improvement in the balance on services, thus leaving the trade balance little affected on average during the 
pre-EMU 90s and the post-EMU era.     8
This implies that in periods in which the real interest rate is higher than the growth of real 
GDP, the government must run a primary surplus ( 0 pd < ). Moreover, it implies that the 
primary surplus consistent with a constant debt-to-GDP ratio increases with the initial 
debt ratio and the difference between the interest rate and the growth rate. Prudent 
governments should not be carried away by currently fortuitous combinations of high 
growth rates and low interest rates if they wish to avoid large increases in public debt, 
especially if the level of the debt ratio is high.  In this vein, the dependence of the primary 
deficit on the state of the business cycle should not be ignored, as in periods of expansion 
(contraction) an unchanged government policy will result in lower (higher) spending 
(e.g., unemployment benefit payments) and higher (lower) tax revenue.    
         
Using equation (2), we can rewrite the debt (ratio) accumulation identity as 
          ,                                    (4) 
**
11 () ( tt t t t t t t b b pd pd pd r g b −− −= + − + − )
where 
*
t pd  stands for the primary deficit ratio when GDP is at its potential level.  This 
equation makes clear the contribution to debt accumulation from operating at an output 
below full capacity. As a result, in equation (4) we have now that debt accumulation 
consists of three components. The first component is the structural  component  and 
measures the contribution of the primary deficit to debt accumulation if the economy is 
operating at full capacity. The second component is the cyclical component (this is the 
second term on the right hand side) and measures the contribution that the primary deficit 
makes to debt accumulation as a result of the economy operating below capacity. Finally, 
the third component, which has been called the rate component, measures the influence 
of the difference between the (real) interest rate and growth of GDP on the debt ratio.   
 
In order to apply equation (4) in the Greek context we need to take into account various 
activities undertaken by governments which are not reported in the budget. This item 
appears under the term stock-flow adjustment, and it is the result of various factors. It can 
be due: to debt guarantees given by the government for the restructuring of publicly-
owned enterprises and sub-national government entities; the variation in the valuation of 
debt denominated in foreign currencies as a result of exchange rate movements; debt 
assumptions by the government  on behalf of third parties; military borrowing which 
affects the deficits only once military equipment has been delivered (until that moment 
the purchase is only recorded in the debt); the acquisitions of financial assets, such as 
capital injections to public enterprises; financial operations related to debt management 
such as the securitisation of future receipts, privatisation certificates, share-convertible 
bonds and exchangeable bonds; and privatisation proceeds (European Economy, 2004). 




11 () ( ) tt t t t t t t b b pd pd pd r g b sf −− −= + − + − + t                             (4a) 
 
Before proceeding with the debt accumulation decomposition, we note that calculating  
*
t pd  depends on the definition (and calculation) of potential output. This is crucial 
because it may affect the results of the debt decomposition. In general, there are two 
methods for calculating the full capacity output, which are called “trend GDP” and 
“sustainable GDP”. Trend GDP takes two points in a time series where the GDP was   9
highest and assumes that the trend between these two points represents the potential GDP 
of the economy; i.e. trend GDP could also be characterized as maximum possible GDP. 
This differs significantly from “sustainable GDP” or, put differently, the maximum 
sustainable GDP. The last one is calculated using a production function approach and 
uses measures of potential employment based on NAIRU estimates.  
 
The Ameco database provides estimates for both measures of potential output, as well as 
estimates of the cyclically adjusted deficit for both of these measures. Since the results of 
using either measure of potential output do not affect to any significant degree the 
contribution of each factor to the evolution of debt, we will present results based on the 
sustainable GDP measure. (The results of the debt decomposition on the basis of trend 
GDP are available from the authors upon request.)     
                                                            
 
Figure 7 here 
 
 
Figure 8 here 
 
 
Figure 7 presents the annual decomposition of the debt accumulation, whereas Figure 8 
presents the compound effect of the different components. Starting from 1990, when 
government debt was 72% of GDP, the debt ratio reached 113% at the end of 2009.  
Figure 8 makes clear that the rise in the debt ratio by 41 percentage points from 1990 to 
2009 can be wholly attributed to the stock-flow effect, which, in the absence of other 
forces, would have contributed 62 percentage points to the debt ratio. The joint, 
cumulative force of the other three components would have subtracted from the debt ratio 
21 percentage points, of which the structural component contributed 12 points, the rate 
component 8 points, and the cyclical component just one percentage point.  
 
Which government actions (both before and after 1991) were responsible for this huge 
contribution of stock-flow adjustments to the rise in the debt ratio? The Greek 
government had accumulated in the past (especially during the 1980s) large implicit 
liabilities in the form of loan guarantees to “restructured enterprises” which became 
quasi-public entities. From 1990 to 1993 the government took over these long-standing 
liabilities of these entities to the banking system – up to that point these liabilities were 
not recorded in government debt.
6 These liabilities (known as “consolidation loans”) 
amounted to 1.8 trillion drachmas (about 5.3 billion euro), and had by 1992 added 10 
percentage points to the debt ratio. Large stock-flow adjustments were also recorded 
during the 1994-2000 period since the second phase of the EMU required a consolidation 
of government accounts, especially with the central bank. The government had three 
accounts with the central bank, which were overdrawn to the sum of 3.04 trillion 
drachmas (about 9 billion euro), all of which had to be transformed into formal debt by 
                                                 
6 Large stock-flow adjustments took place in 1982 and in 1985 as well. These resulted from previous loans 
which the Bank of Greece extended to the government in order for the latter to make off-budget transfers to 
farmers.      10
the end of 1993 so that Greece could enter the second phase of EMU (see Manessiotis 
and Reischauer, 2002 for more details). This action alone added another 16 percentage 
points to the debt ratio. In addition to these very large, debt-increasing, stock-flow 
adjustments, it is worth mentioning that during the consolidation period some (far 
smaller) debt-reducing adjustments were made. These involved the transfer of Social 
Security Fund’s deposits from the central bank (where they were held in its own name) to 
the government’s accounts, as well as the privatization revenue which were used to retire 
public debt.  Further, debt-increasing stock-flow adjustments of similar nature, but of 
smaller significance, were recorded in subsequent years, thus pushing the total to 62 
percentage points by the end of 2009. 
 
From Figure 7 we observe that from 1994 to 2000, the structural component contributed 
on average about 4 percentage points per annum to debt reduction. This process was 
reversed gradually from 2001 to 2009; during this period the structural component added 
on average about 2 percentage points per annum to the increase in the debt ratio. One 
may be justified in thinking that the efforts of Greek governments to reign in the 
accumulation of debt were relaxed after the country gained entry into the Eurozone. A 
more benign interpretation would take into account the steep rise in spending on 
infrastructure which the 2004 Athens Olympics necessitated and the recent global 
financial crisis. Nevertheless, although one could not blame the Greek governments for 
not predicting the global financial crisis, one would prefer that the governments had 
decided to match the extra spending for the Olympics with increased taxation - this would 
have been the prudent response to the vast increase in liabilities caused by the stock-flow 
adjustments.  
 
We note that due to the low interest rate environment in which Greece was operating 
after EMU and until the onset of the global financial crisis, as well as the fast growth 
rates it experienced after 1994, the rate component did not contribute to debt 
accumulation (in fact, it subtracted 8 points).  But suppose that the interest rate is larger 
than the growth rate during a period ( ). Would it be sensible to assume, in this case, 
that a responsible government should aim for programme spending to be equal to revenue 
(i.e., for a zero structural component)? Kneebone and Leach (2001) have suggested that if 
the period is long enough then the debt ratio could rise significantly even if the structural 
component is zero
rg >
7.  To think that sensible policymakers would be content to let debt pile 
up for decades, and that bond market participants would not penalize them for doing so, 
on the basis that “good times” (during which  )   will eventually return, is absurd. 
For this reason, Kneebone and Leach have noted that “… the problem with Fortin’s 
decomposition is that it separates the act of incurring a debt from the act of paying 
interest on that debt. The government is held responsible for its deficits, but someone else 
is held responsible for paying the interest on the debt issued to finance those deficits. 
Unfortunately, there is no one else, and the government should be expected to recognize 
that fact when it incurs debts.” Their preferred decomposition, which redefines the 
gr >
                                                 
7 They point out that the period after the Second World War can be split into two quarter-century sub-
periods; during the first sub-period the growth rate exceeded the interest rate for many OECD countries, 
whereas the opposite was true during the second sub-period.    11
structural component to take into account that debt-burdened governments cannot spend 
as if they were not responsible for paying the interest on the outstanding debt, is:   
                                      (5) 
**
11 (() ) ( ) tt t t t t t t bb p d gr b p d p d s f −− −= −− + − + t
The redefined structural component implies that, if actual and potential output are equal, 
there is no tendency for the debt ratio to rise (in the absence of stock-flow adjustments) if  
*
1 () tt t t pdg r b − =− , rather than
* 0 t pd = , which is the case in Fortin’s definition.   
 
How much would the conclusions we drew for Greece on the basis of Fortin’s 
decomposition change if we adopted the decomposition proposed by Kneebone and 
Leach? Not much, since, as we have seen, the main culprit behind the rise in the debt 
ratio was the stock-flow component
8. We portray the debt decomposition with the 
redefined structural component in Figure 9. Given that the cumulative impact of the rate 
component ( ) to the reduction in the debt ratio was 8 percentage points 
between 1990 and 2009, the redefined structural component’s contribution to reduction in 
the debt ratio is now estimated at 20 (=12+8) percentage points. This allows us to credit 
Greek economic policy with some fiscal rectitude from 1990 to 2009 (although one can 
easily see from Figure 9 that economic policy was indeed responsible in some periods 
and irresponsible in others). However, the rectitude shown on average during this period 
can hardly be classified as prudent behaviour since the fortuitous occurrence of high 
growth and low interest rates for most of this period should not have been considered as a 
permanent fixture given the concurrent developments in the current account and the huge 
deterioration in the net foreign asset position.
1 () tt t gr b − −
9   
                                                          
Figure 9 here 
 
 
4. A More Detailed Look at Government Revenue and Expenditures  
 
The previous section suggests that successive Greek governments have failed (with some 
exceptions) to reign in and reverse the process of debt accumulation. In order to gain a 
                                                 
8 We note that the existence of the stock-flow adjustment term in the Greek case raises some further issues 
on whether the stock-flow adjustment term should be included in the redefined structural component. One 
may argue that, much like the interest payments on debt, governments should not ignore the likelihood that 
some of the contingent liabilities which they have assumed in the past will have to be explicitly honored at 
some time in the near future – we discuss this issue further in the following sections in relation to the 
unfunded obligations of the pension system in Greece.         
9 According to van der Ploeg (2007), “…a prudent minister of finance deliberately underestimates future 
forecasts of national income and the tax base, and sets the tax rate(s) higher and the spending lower than 
without prudence. The benefit of such prudence is that as the inevitable windfall revenues materialize and 
the level of government debt and interest payments fall over time, welcome increases in government 
spending and/or reductions in tax rates can gradually be implemented without jeopardizing the ability of 
governments to act swiftly to stabilize the economy in the face of unexpected macroeconomic shocks”. In 
the Greek context, the presence of a prudent minister of finance would also help since revenue shortfalls 
have been a common occurrence and the reality of cabinet decision making has spending ministers 
squabbling over who has to implement the spending cuts, with the end result being not conducive to 
efficient governance.   
   12
better understanding of the reasons behind this failure we take, in this section, a closer 
look at the main determinants of government expenditures and revenue.  
 
In what follows we focus on a broad measure of the public sector, referred to as General 
Government. This measure differs from the narrowest measure (i.e., Central Government) 
in that in addition to the standard public services (e.g., education, health, defense, law 
enforcement, the judicial system, tax collection), it includes the accounts of the social 
security system (close to 130, at the time of writing, primary and supplementary funds 
providing pension and health insurance); the activities of the sub-national and local 
authorities; the budgets of public entities such as universities and hospitals. The reason 
we concentrate on this measure of the public sector is that it was the focus of the 
Maastricht criteria as well as of the Stability and Growth Pact
10.    
 
The Greek government is highly centralized. Central government collected almost 67% 
of revenues and accounted for about 55% expenditures in 2007; the relevant figures for 
the OECD as a whole are 58% and 43%, respectively (OECD, 2009). Local governments 
represent a very small portion of total revenues and expenditures (Greece: 2.6% and 
5.6%, OECD: 17.6% and 32.2%, respectively) and receive most of their revenues as 
grants from the central government (more than 90% of their funding). Social security 
funds account for over 30% of revenues and almost 40% of expenditures (OECD: 21.4% 
and 24.6%, respectively).  
  
 
4.1 Government Spending and its Components  
 
Up until 1980, government spending in Greece was significantly smaller than the average 
for the countries which became the initial 12 countries of the Euro Area (EA-12). In 
1970, government spending as a proportion of GDP was 23% in Greece and 34% in EA-
12, whereas in 1980 the corresponding figures were 30% for Greece and 43% in the EA-
12.
11 After a huge expansion of the public sector in Greece in the 1980s, government 
spending as a proportion of GDP had by 1990 gone above that of the EA-12, the relevant 
figures being 49% for Greece and 48% for the EA-12 (OECD, 2006). Since the increase 
in spending was not accompanied by corresponding increases in government revenue, the 
explosion in public debt, as well as the prospect of EMU participation forced successive 
Greek governments in the 1990s to put the brakes on government spending. By 1999, 
government spending was down to 44% of GDP in Greece, compared with 48% in EA-
                                                 
10 A still broader measure of the public sector would include the accounts of many public enterprises, which 
are involved in public utilities, energy, infrastructure and transportation services, postal services, and 
various other activities. With the passage of time some of these enterprises have been partially of fully 
privatized. Many of the remaining ones require for their operation considerable annual subsidies and loan 
guarantees, which is one reason why successive governments have tried to privatize them. In any case, the 
continuously shifting boundary of this broader measure of the public sector (and the change in support from 
tax revenue it requires) implies that it may be wiser to express measures pertaining to the composition of 
government spending as proportions of GDP rather than total government spending.     
11 The low share of government spending until 1980 is noteworthy given Greece’s large military spending, 
which has been on average 50% larger than what the government spends on education. The implications of 
this allocation of public spending for Greece’s long-run growth potential are beyond dispute.     13
12. It appears that after gaining entry in the Eurozone, Greek policymakers stopped being 
as vigilant in their efforts to further curb government spending, and by 2008 (before the 
global crisis hit Greece), government spending stood at 48%, climbing to 52%  of GDP in 
2009. Of particular interest is the comparison in the evolution of government spending 
among the southern EU countries. Figure 10 shows that by 1997, government spending 
(as percentage of GDP) in Greece had surpassed the corresponding measures for the 
average of Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, whereas by 2008 it had matched the EU15 
average. 
                                     
Figure 10 here 
 
 
The growth in government spending in Greece is largely accounted by the growth in 
social transfers, which rose from 8% of GDP in 1970 to 21% of GDP in 2009), and in the 
compensation of public employees (from 8% in 1976 to 12.7% of GDP in 2009)
12. Of 
particular interest is the fact that during this period government spending on gross fixed 
capital formation (excluding capital transfers received) remained practically unchanged, 
hovering around 3% of GDP
13.  
 
The growth in transfers (mainly to households) can be partly explained by the fact that as 
late as 1980 Greece spent only 11% of its GDP on income transfers, whereas the average 
for the EU-15 was 17%. The most important category among income transfers in Greece 
is pension benefits. This is the fastest growing category of social spending, and the 
biggest risk regarding the sustainability of public finances in Greece.
14 Government 
spending on pension payments is expected to rise in Greece from 11.7% of GDP in 2007 
to 19.4% in 2035 (for the EU27 the rise is expected to be only 1.7 percentage points, 
taking it to 11.9% of GDP in 2035). Table 1 provides longer term projections for pension 
spending as well as for different categories of age-related expenditures. The sum of all 
other age-related government expenditures is expected to rise by only 1.4 percentage 
points until 2035 (in contrast to the 7.7 percentage points for pensions alone); this makes 
clear that Greek policymakers should ensure that a far-reaching reform of the pension 
system is instituted if the country is to avoid recurring fiscal crises like the one it is 
experiencing in 2010.  
 
 
                                                 
12 For the earlier data see Ministry of National Economy (1998), whereas the recent data are from the 
Ameco database. 
13 Including capitals transfers received (EU funds) would raise this figure to about 6% of GDP during the 
last decade (Ministry of National Economy, 2009).  
14 The Greek government in an effort to deal with the problem adopted some reforms in 2008 which are 
expected to bring some order to the chaotic system of social insurance. The main components of this 
reform were (i) to reduce the number of pension funds (from 133 to 5), whereas many other social 
insurance schemes which were based on agreements between firms and small groups of workers were 
consolidated under six supplementary (pension) schemes and two welfare schemes, (ii) increase the age at 
which some beneficiaries can retire on a full pension, (iii) to increase the age threshold for early retirement, 
(iv) to reduce the replacement rates of supplementary pension schemes, and (v) to improve the rules 
regarding maternity leave in order to encourage more women to enter the labour market (Athanasiou et al., 
2009, and Zervou, 2009).     14
Table 1 here 
 
The large growth in general government spending on public employee compensation 
(from 8.3% of GDP in 1976, to 12.7% in 2009)
15 is the result of considerable increases in 
both the numbers of (general) government employees and in their real wages, especially 
during the 1980s. While up to 2000, the Greek government was spending less (as a 
percentage of GDP) than the EA-12 average on wages and salaries, the inexorable rise in 
government spending on employee compensation is now higher than the EA-12 average. 
Between 1976 and 2009, the number of government employees increased by about 150% 
(from 282 thousand to about 700 thousand
16), while private sector employment during 
the same period increased by about 34% (from 2.95 million to 3.96 million); thus, general 
government employment increased from 8.7% of total employment in 1976 to about 15% 
in 2009.   
 
Real wages of civil servants got a very large boost in the 1980s; as an example, in 1982 
alone, the average salary increases for the lowest-paid civil servants were increased by 
almost 100%, with the increases in some cases being higher than 100%. (In contrast, the 
minimum wage for private sector workers –which, at the time, was set by government-
controlled arbitration - was increased by 46%. CPI inflation was 22% in 1982 and 20% in 
1983.) These huge increases in the salaries of the lowest-paid civil servants were matched 
with significantly lower increases in the salaries of average earners and no pay increases 
for the highest earning categories. As a result, the central government’s wage bill 
increased by 33% in 1982. Following these pay increases, a partial indexation system was 
introduced, which gave workers wage increases at four-month intervals linked to the 
consumer price index. The portion of a worker’s wage below 35,000 drachmas (about 
103 Euro) per month was fully indexed, and components of the worker’s pay above that 
amount were indexed at successively lower rates. The portion of wages above 80,000 
drachmas per month was not indexed at all. This partial indexation formula was kept for a 
few years, subsequently was modified several times, before it was finally abolished in 
1991.
17  
                                                 
15 These numbers are calculated from data in Ministry of National Economy (1998). 
16 The use of the word “about” is intentional. The Ministry of Finance at the moment (March 2010) has no 
precise idea of the total number of general government employees. This reflects mainly the unwillingness 
of various Ministries to reveal the number of civil servants employed in their core operations and in the 
public enterprises under their control.  OECD (2009) reports that in 2005 public sector employment was 
14.1% of the labour force; with a labour force of 4.85 million, this implies that public sector employment 
was about 684 thousand in 2005.  The number of employees in the wider public sector, including 
employees on short-term contracts, is estimated by some sources (Eurostat) to be just over 1 million, 
implying that its share in total employment is about 23%.  In April 2010, estimates from the Athens 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry raise the number of public sector employees to 1.1 million (inclusive 
of military personnel), whereas the Ministry of Interior recently announced that the number of public sector 
employees is 678 thousand.  These large differences in numbers reflect, among other things, the fact that 
some public entities (e.g. Universities) employ a number of people out of own generated funds; these 
people are sometimes counted as public sector employees, but their salaries are not drawn out of the 
government’s budget. 
17 The gradual recognition among policymakers of the significant disincentive effects of the resulting wage 
compression effects of such a “progressive” scheme of wage indexation was one factor behind its 
abandonment.    15
 
The growth in public sector compensation costs was renewed in the 1990s under different 
guises. Wages in public enterprises have grown significantly faster than wages in other 
sectors. We can see from Figure 11 that the cumulative increase over the 1995-2006 
period in (gross) nominal private sector wages (excluding the banking sector) was 82%, 
whereas the cumulative increase in public sector wages was 118%, and in publicly owned 
enterprises 157% (see Fotoniata and Moutos, 2010). These large differentials in the 
evolution of pay not only make working for the private sector a less attractive option, but 
are also associated with higher tax rates and/or higher (relative) prices of publicly 
provided goods and services, since they hardly reflect differential increases in 
productivity between the public and private sectors. 
 
Figure 11 here 
 
The above described developments in public sector pay and employment, reflects the fact 
that public sector employment has remained a main tool through which political parties in 
Greece dispense favours to partisan voters, as well a “redistributive” tool in periods of 
high unemployment (see Demekas and Kontolemis, 2000). The relatively large size of 
employment in the public sector, and the desire of the two contending-for-the-
government political parties in Greece to use appointments in the public sector to gain 
votes was one of the factors responsible for why the increases in public sector wages 
were consistently above those awarded in the private sector
18.    
 
4.2 Sources of Government Funding 
 
The rise in government revenue followed, sometimes with considerable lag, the rise in 
government spending. Unlike government spending, whose fastest rise took place in the 
1980s (its share in GDP rose by 18 percentage points), government revenue as a share of 
GDP rose by only 5 percentage points in the 1980s (from 27% in 1980 to 32% in 1990). 
The necessary adjustment in government revenue occurred in the 1990s, when its GDP 
share rose by 11 percentage points (from 32% of GDP in 1990 to 43% in 2000). This 
brought Greece’s tax burden 3 percentage points below the EU15 average (and above the 
average for Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), but by 2009 government receipts in 
Greece (at 37% of GDP) had again fallen below the EU15 (which stood at 44.3%) and 
the 4-country average (which stood at 39.2%).  
 
Figure 12 here 
 
 
Direct taxes (including social security taxes) contributed the most to the rise in 
government revenue; whereas in 1976 they were 13% of GDP and 47% of total 
                                                 
18 We note that the available evidence questions the wisdom of using government spending in Greece in 
order to control the business cycle. For example, Papageorgiou et al (2009) simulate a DSGE model 
calibrated to match Greek data and find that increases in public spending generate multipliers which are 
small (and can even turn negative) if distorting taxes are used to finance them.   
   16
government revenue, by 2009 they had risen to 23% of GDP and 59% of government 
revenue. As a result, the significance of indirect taxes declined from 46% of government 
revenue in 1976 to 30% in 2009. This reduction in the importance of indirect taxes was a 
result of two forces: first, the harmonization of indirect taxation in Greece with those of 
the (then) EEC in 1980 (the year prior to Greece’s accession to the EEC) when many 
indirect taxes were cut or abolished
19; second, the creation of the Single Market in 1993, 
when more indirect taxes were abolished. Figure 13 depicts the evolution of different 
sources of tax revenue. 
 
Figure 13 here 
 
 
Social security contributions, which provided 26% of government revenue in 1976, rose 
to represent 31% of revenue in 1985, and climbed to 38% in 2009. This rise in the 
importance of social security contributions in tax revenue came about through large rises 
in statutory tax rates. In 1981, the rate for employer social security contributions stood at 
18.75%, whereas the employee rate at 10.25%.  By 2008, these rates had risen to 28% for 
employers and 16% for employees. The relevant figures for the EU15 average in 2008 
were 24% and 11.4%, respectively (OECD, 2008).   
 
The tax system in Greece has been and remains regressive relative to other EU countries. 
This is mainly because the income tax exhausts all of its progressivity at moderate 
income levels, e.g., in 2009 a proportional tax rate applied to all incomes above the 
€60.000 threshold. The taxation of interest income, which began in 1992, is another 
factor which contributes to making the tax system regressive. This is because this tax is 
not integrated with the income tax, and interest income is taxed at a constant rate which is 
independent of the taxpayer’s other sources of income. In addition, many sources of 
income from investments in financial assets preferred by higher income groups have been 
either tax-free (i.e. repos) or are taxed at low rates. Finally, whereas in the past some 
indirect taxes on consumer durables were contributing to the progressivity of the tax 
system (i.e. excise tax on passenger cars, gasoline tax, road duties due to the fact that car 
ownership was concentrated among the better-off), these taxes have now become 
regressive as ownership of these goods has spread and there is no significant 
differentiation in the taxes applied between higher-priced and lower-priced items 
(Manessiotis and Reischauer, 2001).   
 
If one were to observe the broad outlines of the Greek tax system in 2009, she may be 
tempted to conclude that it does not differ significantly from the tax system of other EU 
countries
20. However, the Greek tax system is replete with serious drawbacks. These 
have arisen as the tax system has been changing frequently in ad-hoc fashion to comply 
with EU regulations, to generate additional revenue, and to reverse (or, sometimes foster) 
real or perceived inequities of the tax system.  These changes have been most of the times 
                                                 
19 Following Greece’s entry in the EEC in 1981, there was a large decrease of tariff revenue; whereas in 
1974 tariff revenue contributed 7.5% to the total tax revenue, by 1982 the share of tariff revenue in total tax 
revenue had declined to 1.8%, and by 1990 had declined to below 0.1%.    
20 Nevertheless, the Greek tax system still retains its heavier reliance on indirect taxes.   17
impervious to how the overall tax system serves the goals of vertical and horizontal 
equity, and on whether it promotes an efficient allocation of resources and fosters the 
country’s international competitiveness.  
 
Both the issues of equity and efficiency are adversely affected by the main issue       
bedeviling Greek public finances, i.e. tax evasion. This issue is particularly pertinent 
among those owning small businesses and the self-employed (from plumbers and 
electricians to medical doctors and lawyers)
21. In the past, Greek governments have tried 
to deal with tax evasion by inferring an individual’s income on the basis of “objective 
criteria”. This method presumes that a minimum level of income is required for an 
individual to own assets or consumer durables of various sizes or value (e.g., houses, 
swimming pools, passenger cars, motor boats) and to pay for household services (e.g., 
maids, gardeners, drivers, tutors). An individual’s tax obligations would then be 
calculated on the higher of their reported or “objectively calculated” income
22. Various 
other methods have also been tried in the past in order to infer the income of self-
employed individuals (e.g., in the case of dentists an algorithm based on the years of 
practice, the geographical location of the surgery, the use of dental assistants, etc.).          
 
Despite the shortcomings of these methods, it is worth noting that they resulted in higher 
tax obligations for many of the professional classes (e.g., medical doctors, dentists, 
lawyers, architects), which on average reported incomes below those earned by 
manufacturing workers. These methods were abandoned a few years ago in the 
expectation that the reduction in statutory tax rates would increase taxpayer compliance. 
However, the response of the professional classes was not the expected one since they 
continued to declare ridiculously low incomes
23. As a result, the current Greek 
government, forced also by the threat of default, is bringing forward legislation which 
reinstates (and in some cases reinforces) the old “objective criteria” for the calculation of 
minimum taxable income. Although this is a move in the right direction, it remains 
uncertain whether tax administration officials will be willing to let the State have the tax 
revenue corresponding to the difference between the true incomes of the professional 
classes and the statutory minimum taxable income rather than being “persuaded” by these 
elite taxpayers to let the matter rest
24.    
                                                 
21 The share of the self-employed in total employment is very high in Greece; at 30% it is the highest in the 
OECD, and about 18 percentage points higher than the EU15 average (Fotoniata and Moutos, 2010). 
22 In addition to income tax evasion, firms and workers (sometimes in amicable agreement with the firm, 
sometimes succumbing to take-it-or-leave-it threats by the firm) engage in considerable evasion of their 
social security contributions. The Inspectorate Service of the Social Insurance Foundation (IKA) estimated 
that employers in 10% of all firms inspected in 2008 failed to pay social contributions, while 27% of all 
workers remained unregistered (Matsaganis et al, 2010).  
23 For example, according to data released from the Ministry of National Economy, among the 151 medical 
doctors practicing in the most lucrative (for medical professionals)  area of Athens, more than 40% of them 
reported annual, before-tax, incomes less than €20.000 in 2008. This figure is lower than the corresponding 
average for wage earners.    
24 Tatsos (2001) presents evidence according to which high earners in Greece were more inclined to non-
compliance. This may not only reflect the possibility that it is inherently more difficult to find the true 
incomes of the self-employed, but it may also reflect their ability to offer higher bribes, or to draw on their 
high social connections in order to “discipline” (e.g. through unfavourable postings) any forthright tax 
officials who wanted to do their duty.     18
 
In addition to the scandalously large rates of income tax evasion
25, Greece faces very 
high rates of payroll tax evasion. As is to be expected in such cases, the estimates vary 
widely. Studies conducted by the Social Insurance Foundation (IKA) estimate that 
payroll tax evasion has increased through the years; the early 1990s estimates were 
hovering around 13% of revenues, whereas more recent estimates raise this figure from 
about 16% in 2003, to 20% in 2005 (POPOKP, 2005). The numbers of persons who were  
either forced or chose to remain uninsured was estimated to be close to 23% of total 
employment, with the  immigrants being 4 times more likely to be uninsured than the 
indigenous population. The steady increase of the share of immigrants in the labour force 
may thus be a contributing factor to the rise in payroll tax evasion. Another reason behind 
the high evasion rates is that the system was badly designed; for example, (private sector) 
workers insured with IKA, receive practically the same (post-tax-and-benefits) pension 
independently of whether one was paying contributions for 15 or 30 years,  and whether 
one was earning (and contributing) twice as much as the other
26. The incentives for 
collusion between employer and employee in order to minimize their social security 
contributions are obvious in such a case
27.    
 
A fundamental issue bedevilling the Greek tax system is that problems, policies and 
solutions are recycled, with damaging effects on long-term coherence. On the face of it, 
successive Greek governments have tried to implement reforms aimed at increasing the 
efficiency of tax collection, mainly through efforts to curb tax evasion. For example, 
from 2004 to 2007 new measures were instituted with the aim of reducing tax evasion.               
The most important of these measures were: (i) the imposition of VAT on new buildings 
(aimed at reducing the incidence of informal activity in construction activities), and (ii) 
the upgrading of the information technology used for the cross-checking of tax data and 
the restructuring of audit services. In addition, cuts in personal income taxes and 
measures to broaden the tax base (through the imposition of a 10% tax on dividends and 
capital gains) and to simplify the tax system (through a unique property holding tax) were 
introduced. Yet, much as the mythical Atlas, the monster of tax evasion, has not shrugged 
from the weight of these measures. A reason for that is the measures are most of the time 
piecemeal and do not take into account all other pieces of existing legislation
28. Another 
                                                 
25 Schneider and Enste (2000) and Schneider (2006) estimate the size of the shadow economy in Greece to 
be the largest (as a proportion of GDP) among 21 OECD countries. Their estimates hover between 25 and 
30 percent of GDP. Tatsos (2001) argues that tax evasion may have been as high as 15% of GDP in 1997.    
26 For example, somebody earning €450 per month and contributing for 15 years, would have received (in 
2005) just €16 less per month than somebody earning €900 per month and contributing for 30 years, after 
the Social Solidarity Subsidy (EKAS) was taken into account.   
27 We note that the above figures do not take into account the huge arrears in the payments of social 
security contributions by employers (see, Experts Report on Social Insurance, 2010). Sometimes 
“politically influential” employers (e.g., owners of newspapers or TV stations) are allowed to carry forward 
their obligations under the implicit understanding that they will never have to pay as long as they provide a 
friendly (or, not an openly hostile) forum for the political party in power. Beyond outright corruption, 
threats of bankruptcy and the attendant employment losses seem also to have persuaded some officials to 
turn a blind eye to such infringements.   
28 The Commission for Reforming the Tax System (2002) produced a report (known as the 
“Georgakopoulos Report”) with a comprehensive set of measures which should be undertaken in order to 
increase both the allocation and efficiency effects of the tax system as well as increase its transparency and   19
reason is that recurring tax amnesties have eroded the credibility of the system by 
providing incentives to taxpayers to delay and eventually evade the payment of taxes.  A 
further incentive for tax-evading behaviour is provided by the existence of deadlines that 
permit taxpayers to be absolved of their tax obligations if the state has not managed to 
collect the owed taxes in time
29. In 2007 alone, around €3.5 billion (about 1.5% of GDP) 
in taxes were written off, mainly to lapses in time for the collection of the tax revenue 
(State Audit Report, 2008).             
 
5. Some Salient Features of Greek Political Economy 
 
A natural question to ask at this point is what features of the Greek state, economy, and 
society are conducive to the “imprudent” behaviour described in previous sections? In 
other words, how did the amalgamation of private and state interests gradually lead to the 
current state of affairs?   
 
Greece’s strong macroeconomic performance from 1953 to 1974 was to a large extent 
underpinned by the April 1953 devaluation of the drachma (by 50% vis-à-vis the US 
dollar).  This period coincided with monetary stability (the inflation rate for Greece in the 
1960s was 2% per annum), which was interrupted by the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system and the first oil crisis. The restoration of democracy in 1974 released a pent-up 
demand for increased consumption, which lead to declining rates of capital accumulation 
and economic growth. At the same time, the dismantling of repressive political 
mechanisms meant that governments had to rely on social and economic policy measures 
in order to garner political support. The growing societal demands, along with the 
willingness of the then conservative governments to appease an electorate which was all 
too eager to resume the radicalism of the 1960s, led to a transfer of systemic power from 
the state to society, or rather, from a moderately-effective state bureaucracy (the 
semblance of a strong state in the Weberian tradition) to groups which claimed to better 
represent society’s interests (Pagoulatos, 2003).   
 
The growing influence of societal groups (from trade unions to employer associations) in 
combination with the excessive politicization and weakening of the autonomy of the 
bureaucratic apparatus after 1974 (and especially after 1981) paved the way for the 
gradual transformation of the Greek state administration from an almost “developmental 
state” to an “intermediate state” (Evans, 1995)
30. This transformation was effected by the 
greater penetration of the state bureaucracy by the two political parties (New Democracy 
and PASOK) which alternated in government since 1974. The objective of both parties 
was to capture all aspects of public administration by transforming the older 
                                                                                                                                                 
taxpayer compliance. The report was widely praised in government circles, but as is usual in such cases in 
Greece, and despite the fact that it was a government-sponsored report, its recommendations were largely 
ignored in favour of piecemeal legislation.     
29 As much as one may want to attribute such losses in tax revenue to the inefficiency of public 
administration, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that outright collusion between the tax authorities and 
some “politically-connected” taxpayers does not take place.   
30 The term “developmental state” is meant to capture the benevolent power exercised by an autonomous 
elite state bureaucracy, which has the ability and the foresight to channel funds to productivity and 
competitiveness enhancing activities (Johnson, 1982).    20
individualistic (or family-based) system of patron-client relationships to one dependent 
on favours bestowed on party members by the party machine (Charalambis, 1989). The 
absence of a strong and confident bureaucracy in Greece allowed the political parties to 
have an overwhelming influence on personnel choice and promotion to potentially 
lucrative posts.  The capture of the public administration by the political parties was 
cemented by the fragmentation of the unions representing public-sector workers along 
party-political lines. In effect, this meant that able civil servants had to “take sides” and 
“declare their allegiance” with a particular political party if they wanted to avoid being 
left behind in their careers while other less able employees were promoted. As a result, 
many civil servants were using great discretion in applying the rule of law: “politically-
connected” citizens were receiving favourable treatment (e.g. land use and public health 
violations were ignored, tax evasion was not sanctioned, etc) whereas the full weight of 
the bureaucratic complexity of rules and regulations was applied to “unimportant” 
citizens. The latter, fully cognizant of the formal power of the bureaucracy to invent 
obstacles to the timely settling of the issues at hand, were often induced to offer bribes 
for the timely (but not unlawful) clearing of the matter
31. The continuous sharing of 
experiences among citizens regarding their dealings with the state bureaucracy, along 
with the increasingly apparent indifference of the state apparatus (including the legal 
system) to the unlawful conduct of many civil servants, led, albeit grudgingly, to the 
“normalization” of this situation, and to a reduction in the apparently Quixotic efforts of 
some citizens to officially report on such occurrences.  Moreover, gradually “bad 
behaviour” was driving out “good behaviour”, since many civil servants who were not 
willing to submit to the party apparatchiks (usually colleagues who were trade union 
officials), were marginalized.  
 
Political patronage was effective not only in distributing favours to civil servants and 
aiding in the unlawful acts of private citizens; it was also detrimental in influencing the 
work ethos and professionalism of public sector employees (tax officials, judges, medical 
doctors, teachers and professors included as well).
32 The case of the National Statistical 
Service of Greece (ESYE) is particularly apt in this respect.
33 The history of ESYE 
reveals that its chief officer (General Secretary) was replaced when a new party was 
elected to power. The main objective behind this practice was to control the flow of 
information; in this respect, the personal or political allegiance of the chief officer was 
the most crucial factor for the appointment. However, given the recent allegations against 
the credibility of the data provided by ESYE, one wonders why the choice of the chief 
officer by the party in power would be enough to stop leaks to journalists by upstanding 
employees or of employees with different political affiliations in cases that the accuracy 
of the data was in question
34. Among possible answers is that in environments in which 
                                                 
31 According to the Ombudsman of the Greek Republic, civil servants enjoy too great a discretion in regard 
to the texts they have to apply, or else the procedures are so lacking in transparency and so open to 
interpretation that they encourage corruption among the public who want their administrative problems 
settled in a reasonable time (Greek Ombudsman, 2004). 
32 Comparative analysis of public sector efficiency suggests that Greece could have achieved the same level 
of public sector output by using only 73% of the inputs it is using (Afonso et al, 2003).  
33 We wish to thank Alfons Weichenrieder for prompting us to examine this case. 
34 In fact, in 2003, a high-ranking employee refused to sign the release of some data. Although the case was 
reported in the press, no further details are available.      21
the ethos and professionalism of employees are undermined by the open exercise of 
favouritism, the narrowly-defined interest of the employees (i.e. their incomes) takes 
precedence. This was aptly illustrated in 2003 when the Minister of Finance decided to 
grant ESYE independence from the Ministry. This would have meant that ESYE’s 
employees would receive a lower income since some benefits received by the Ministry of 
Finance employees would no longer be received by them. After a two-month strike in 
2003, the employees managed to “persuade” the then Minister of Finance to remain under 
the mantle of the Ministry. Following the change in government in 2004, they also 
received a significant increase in their incomes after the favourable intervention that the 
newly appointed General Secretary made, on their behalf, to the new Finance Minister. 
The significance of the Minister’s decision was not lost on ESYE employees; they 
understood that if they failed to “co-operate” by insisting on independent checks on the 
data sent to them by the General Accounting Office, the Minister of Finance may well 
decide to turn ESYE into an independent authority with the attendant loss of incomes. 
We note that the existence of some employees for whom the execution of their sworn 
duty carries more weight than their level of income may not be enough to allow for 
evidence-based leakages to the press regarding the accuracy of the reported data. Such 
leakages can be prevented by (i) allowing only the “trustworthy” to have access to the 
totality of the data, and (ii) by cultivating a culture in which the interests of the many 
employees should take precedence over issues of personal integrity (public sector trade 
unions are particularly adept at this), thus threatening to socially ostracize potential 
whistleblowers (in addition, to negative repercussions for their career).  
 
The gradual weakening of state power did not go unnoticed by the private sector. 
Sometimes forced by the blatant extortionary demands of civil servants, sometimes 
taking the first step in nurturing a mutually beneficial relationship with the civil servants, 
private interests have captured the day-to-day functioning of public administration, and 
have distorted the implementation of economic policy. However, in case anyone thought 
that the problems of the Greek state arise mostly from the existence of unscrupulous civil 
servants who fail to implement the decisions of benevolent policymakers, two examples 
of irresponsible policy actions (the second one in the middle of the brewing fiscal crisis) 
will suffice: in September 2003 and in April 2009 the government decided to cut taxes on 
automobiles, the tax cut in both cases resulting in a small drop in the price of low-priced 
models (less than 2%), and a large drop in the prices of expensive models (more than 
15%). Given that Greece had a large debt/GDP ratio and was running considerable 
budget deficits despite fast growth (in 2003), we have to concede defeat in finding an 
explanation in favour of the economic efficiency or the social justice of these tax 
expenditures.  
 
Allowing private interests to shape policymaking and their implementation may have 
helped some groups, but the aggregate effect of public sector inefficacy in policy 
implementation and in the provision of public services had deleterious effects on the 
dynamism and competitiveness of the private sector
35. One may appreciate the adverse 
                                                 
35 Angelopoulos et al. (2009) provide some estimates of the social costs of rent seeking for many European 
countries. They find that Greece exhibits the highest rent extraction and rent seeking, with about 53% of tax 
revenue extracted by rent seekers.   22
effects of the failure of the state apparatus to provide an adequate amount and quality of 
public services as well as to raise the necessary tax revenue in an efficient manner, by 
considering the following interactions between tax evasion, the provision of public 
services, and the competitiveness of the economy.  
 
Although it is easy to understand the political economy behind the labyrinthine structure 
of the Greek tax system (i.e. special interest politics, with the interest of tax officials 
playing a large role, since its simplification would reduce their ability to extract bribes), 
its consequences are not equally obvious. This is because tax evasion, among other 
things, affects (i) the specialization of the economy between traded and non-traded 
sectors, and (ii) the economy-wide productivity level.   
 
In order to understand how these effects come about, we need to make only one 
assumption, namely, that tax evasion is more prevalent in non-traded goods (medical and 
law services, car repairs, etc) than on traded goods. The realism of this assumption can be 
appreciated by realizing that, as is well known in the literature (e.g. Bernard and Jensen, 
1995), exporting firms tend to be larger than firms selling only in the home market, and 
to be more productive as well. It is also well known (e.g. de Paula and Scheinkman, 
2009), that exporting firms usually transact with other formal-sector firms, like financial 
intermediaries, and also need the appropriate documentation to export.  
 
The implication of the above is that the effective after-tax relative price of the traded 
sector is smaller than what one would surmise by looking simply at the prices of the two 
sectors, thus attracting fewer resources in the traded sector. Fighting tax evasion results in 
a rise in the effective relative price of the traded sector, reduces the attractiveness of non-
traded sector activities, and makes the economy more export-oriented. In addition, since 
exporting, and, in general, formal-sector firms are more productive than informal sector 
firms (see, Rausch, 1991), the correction in the existing distortion regarding resource 
allocation which the reduction in tax evasion would bring about, would raise the 
economy’s overall productivity and thus contribute to higher living standards.  
 
In addition to its effects on the allocation of economic activity, the economy’s openness 
and its level of productivity, the gradual deterioration in the efficacy of public 
administration had other, even more serious, consequences on economic outcomes. Since 
1975, tax revenue, as a proportion of GDP, have increased by more than 60% (from about 
25% to about 40%)
36.  However, this rise in the tax burden has not been balanced by an 
equivalent rise in the provision of public services. In fact, in some cases, there has been a 
significant rise in spending on privately-provided services which complement the 
worsening quality of publicly-provided ones. A prominent example of such expenditures 
results from the numerus clausus arrangements regarding entry to tertiary education in 
Greece, and the attendant competitive national examinations.  Although there has been a 
large rise in the proportion of students admitted to tertiary education during the last 35 
                                                                                                                                                 
  
36 It bears noting that this rise in the tax burden in Greece was not felt equally by all; it is likely that the rise 
in the tax burden of employees has been significantly higher since they can not evade taxes on their formal 
sector jobs, although they can do so by moonlighting.   23
years (from about 15% of the high-school graduates in 1974 to about 40% in 2008), thus 
lessening the competition for the available places,  private spending on crammer schools 
preparing students for the national exams has increased; Kanellopoulos et al. (2003) 
estimate that the share of education expenditures in household budgets (mainly on 
crammer schools and private tutors) rose from 2.15 % in 1974 to 4.41% in 1999. Recent 
studies (KANEP, 2009) estimate that in 2005 this figure had risen to 5.09% of household 
budgets. (As a proportion of household spending for families with children in secondary 
school this can reach to more than 20% of household income, see Psacharopoulos and 
Papakonstantinou, 2005.) This rise in spending on crammer schools and on hiring of 
private tutors
37 reflects the widespread perception among parents (and teachers) of a 
continuing deterioration in the quality of publicly-provided education
38.  
 
The same inadequacies regarding the provision of public services have also been 
documented with respect to health care, in which case many attempts at efficiency-and 
equity-enhancing reforms have been prevented by powerful elites (e.g., professors in 
medical schools) – for details see Mossialos and Allin (2005), and Mossialos et al (2005). 
The deterioration in the effectiveness of health care provision in Greece has been 
documented by Data Envelopment Analysis which links health outcomes to the resources 
allocated to health care, as well as other relevant variables. OECD (2009b) estimates that 
between 1990 and 2006 the relative efficiency of Greece’s health care system eroded 
significantly, and that this decline in performance stems more from a decline in technical 
and organizational efficiency rather than from higher input prices.  
 
The upshot of these has been that the drop in disposable incomes has not been counter-
balanced by an equivalent reduction in spending needs due to adequate provision of 
public services. Private sector workers have been particularly hit by these developments, 
since their wages have not been increasing as fast as public sector wages (see, Figure 11). 
These large differentials in the evolution of pay not only made working for the private 
sector a less attractive option, but are also associated with higher tax rates and/or higher 
(relative) prices of publicly provided goods and services, since they hardly reflect 
differential increases in productivity between the public and private sectors.  
 
In consequence, private sector unions, which cared about the value of real wages (net of 
taxes, but inclusive of public services), have been trying to extract from the employers 
nominal wage increases above the sum of expected inflation and productivity gains. 
Indeed, a common claim which the leaders of the General Confederation of Greek 
Workers brought during the bi-annual rounds of wage negotiations was that the 
government-announced figures for inflation (past and expected) were significantly below 
                                                 
37 Lest a reader think otherwise, the incomes of private tutors go largely unreported.  
38 The drop in the quality of public education has been reinforced by the rising importance of crammer 
schools and private tutors. In many cases, the private tutors are also (illegally) full-time public school 
teachers. Since their income as private tutors depends on their performance as such, while their income as 
public school teachers is independent of the quality of their teaching at the public school (which takes place 
in the morning), they usually devote less energy to their morning duties as they try to preserve their 
enthusiasm for their private classes later in the day. As a result, students also tend to pay less attention to 
their less energetic morning teachers, and try to direct their effort to learning more from (sometimes the 
same) private tutors and crammer school teachers.      24
the true rises in the cost of living due to the growing need to supplement the declining 
quality of public services by privately- provided ones. The upshot of this has been a 
wage-price spiral which resulted in rises in nominal wage and price inflation (since firms 
were able to keep real wages from rising above productivity gains
39), whose detrimental 
effect on international competitiveness was forcing continuous devaluations of the 
drachma. Following Greece’s entry into EMU, the inflationary pressures subsided, but a 
positive inflation (and unit labour cost) differential remained vis-à-vis the other eurozone 
countries, resulting in real exchange rate appreciation, which contributed to the widening 
of the trade and current account deficits and the fast rise of net foreign debt to about 90% 
of GDP in the first quarter of 2010.  
 
In addition to the continuous loss of competitiveness due to wage increases for the 
reasons described earlier, the private sector in Greece had to navigate through a 
haphazard bureaucratic environment which, although formally defended as an attempt of 
the state to promote the public, as opposed to private, interest, it created a rent-seeking 
apparatus which allowed both inefficient firms to remain in operation and stifled the 
development of new enterprises
40.  Given that public sector employment has remained a 
main tool through which political parties in Greece dispense favours to partisan voters, as 
well a “redistributive” tool in periods of high unemployment, it is unsurprising that 
successive governments in Greece have responded to the lack of job creation by the 
private sector through an expansion of public employment. The loop thus closed; i.e. 
increases in public employment (without equivalent increases in publicly provided goods 
and services), result in increased tax rates and wage demands, a weakening of private 
sector performance and employment opportunities, with the “nanny” state intervening to 
alleviate what it may have caused in the first place, thus providing a new impetus to the 
vicious circle. The current multifaceted crisis of the Greek economy and society may 
force an end to this vicious circle, if the loop’s causality is correctly diagnosed and there 
is the attendant political capital to enforce the necessary reforms
41.    
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The Greek economy entered the second phase of EMU with both a large public debt and 
a large budget deficit, and went through a reduction of more than 9 percentage points (of 
GDP) in its budget deficit between 1993 and 2000 in order to be admitted to the euro 
area. Unfortunately, these efforts were to a large extent abandoned in the subsequent 
years. This was because in the pre-EMU accession phase, the threat of exclusion acted 
                                                 
39 From 1995 to 2008, the rise in both the minimum and the average wage has not kept up with increases in 
business sector productivity (Fotoniata and Moutos, 2010).    
40 According to Pedersini (2007), Greece has the largest share of micro enterprises (i.e. those with less than 
10 employees) among the EU15 countries. The preponderance of these enterprises – which mainly cater for 
the domestic market - testifies to the lack of dynamism in the private sector. 
41 An alternative interpretation of the loop has causality running from an inefficient private sector whose 
apparent success in the past relied on the heavy protection (cum subsidies) accorded to Greek industry. This 
came to an end after Greece joined the EEC in 1981, which “forced” the Greek state to assume the role of 
“employer of last resort” (see Tsakalotos, 1998, 2005, for a variant of this argument). Although we think 
that this interpretation has some merits, we note that in 1981 there was also a “regime” change in Greece 
with the rise to power of a Socialist government and the intensification of the politicization of the 
bureaucracy, thus making it very hard to disentangle the influence of each factor.      25
like a hard budget constraint which forced the Greek government to redress its fiscal 
imbalances. In contrast to the, output-driven, “hard-conditionality” of the pre-accession 
period, the post-EMU accession period was characterized by the “soft-conditionality” of 
the Stability and Growth Pact, which allowed Greece (even more than other 
governments) to breach both the letter and the spirit of the Pact (von Hagen, 2005). Of 
more concern for the current developments is the fact that the Maastricht criteria stated 
numerical targets without paying any attention to the modality or quality of fiscal 
adjustment.  
 
There seems to be a consensus in the literature that the quality of fiscal adjustment 
depends on the way fiscal consolidations are achieved. In particular, it has been argued 
that fiscal adjustments which rely too heavily on increasing tax revenue rather than on 
cutting government spending are less likely to be successful and sustainable (e.g., Alesina 
and Ardagna, 1998, Perotti et al., 1998, von Hagen and Strauch, 2001). A reason for this 
is that for the consolidation to be successful it must deal forcefully not only with 
politically-sensitive spending items, such as transfers and public sector wages, but it must 
also stop the hidden (legal or otherwise) subsidies given to inefficient, but politically-
connected firms, which stifle the creation of new and productive ones
42.  Stamping out on 
these cancerous “collaborations” between private interests and the (formally) appointed 
custodians of the public interest is the only way to break up the vicious circle in which 
many firms survive due to government kickbacks while at the same time the government 
acts as the “employer of last resort” thus both shouldering the obligations of inefficient 
firms and burdening both workers and efficient firms with unnecessarily high tax rates 
and excessive red tape.     
The Greek experience confirms the temporary nature of adjustments which rely too 
heavily on tax increases. From 1993 to 2000, the share of tax revenue in GDP increased 
by about 8 percentage points whereas the share of government spending remained intact. 
The recent (May 2010) case of a former Transport Minister who admitted to accepting 
payments from the Greek branch of a multinational firm which was a large supplier to the 
Greek government – he described these payments in testimony as “pre-election 
donations”- along with many other cases currently under investigation for corruption, 
provide further evidence  that in countries in which outright corruption and tax evasion 
are endemic the beneficiaries of these practices will use their political power to minimize 
the reduction in public spending (their main source of pilfering) and shift the burden of 
budget consolidation to increases in taxation (which they are adept at avoiding or 
evading). Our analysis has shown why such a political strategy can be a winner: it allows 
for the development of a heterogeneous coalition of voters. In addition to the corrupt “big 
fish”, these are: the many (usually low-income, low-skill) households for whom the 
government is the employer of last resort, the self employed (among whom the incidence 
of tax evasion is high, but whose incomes depend on government contacts), and the 
farmers (whose survival depends on subsidies and are not heavily taxed), not to mention 
many corrupt public sector employees whose “discretionary” income depends on the size 
of government.     
                                                 
42 Very often in Greece, the hidden subsidies take the form of tax expenditures in the form of very low tax 
rates (or tax exemptions) for certain politically powerful sectors.    26
During the soft conditionality of the EMU period, government spending renewed its 
upward path whereas tax revenue (as shares of GDP) started declining. The lack of 
prudence (or foresight) displayed by the Greek governments since 2000, is symptomatic 
not only of the low interest rates that EMU entry availed to Greece, but also of the deep 
entanglement between political and economic power that continues to engulf Greece. 
Powerful elites, “aided” by the cheap access to funds which EMU seemed to provide,   
have managed to maintain their ability to raid on state coffers, to hamper the adequate 
provision of public services at the benefit of private providers, and to forestall innovating 
(but threatening to their interests) firms from coming into  existence. These elites have 
managed to legitimize their position by permitting weaker groups to also benefit by a 
system of soft budget constraints (or, outright anomie) in which the pilfering of public 
resources remains largely unpunished. As a result, Greece has reached a frightening 
homeostasis which can be broken only if the main beneficiaries of the current politico-
economic equilibrium lose their undue privileges. The hard conditionality imposed on 
Greece in May 2010 by the EU/ECB/IMF will not succeed in averting an eventual default 
(through the usual austerity measures) unless it acts as the outside force which succeeds 
in reducing the power of the elites. In this respect, we note that although the elites, and 
most of the Greek population, are, at the moment, in favour of the bailout (though, the 
latter, not of the austerity measures), it would not surprise us if the elites switched in 
favour of default later, in case they thought that their power to shape policy in Greece 
could be compromised by policy proposals of the outside actors which went beyond the 
usual austerity measures.    
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Table 1. Age-related government expenditure, 2007-2060, % of GDP 
 
   Greece  EU27  Euro-area 
Level 2007  11.7  10.2  11.1 
Change 2007 2035  7.7  1.7  2.1  Pensions 
Change 2007 2060  12.4  2.4  2.8 
Level 2007  5.0  6.7  6.7 
Change 2007 2035  0.9  1.0  1.0  Health care 
Change 2007 2060  1.4  1.5  1.4 
Level 2007  1.4  1.2  1.3 
Change 2007 2035  0.8  0.6  0.7 
Long-term 
care 
Change 2007 2060  2.2  1.1  1.4 
Level 2007  0.3  0.8  1.0 
Change 2007 2035  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2 
Unemployment 
benefits 
Change 2007 2060  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2 
Level 2007  3.7  4.3  4.2 
Change 2007 2035  -0.3  -0.3  -0.3  Education 
Change 2007 2060  0.0  -0.2  -0.2 
Level 2007  22.1  23.1  24.3 
Change 2007 2035  9.1  2.7  3.2  Total 
Change 2007 2060  15.9  4.7  5.2 
Source: Commission Services, EPC 
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